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Abstract
Using the game-theoretic framework for probability, Vovk and Shafer [10] have shown that it
is always possible, using randomization, to make sequential probability forecasts that pass any
countable set of well-behaved statistical tests. This result generalizes work by other authors,
who consider only tests of calbration.
We complement this result with a lower bound. We show that Vovk and Shafer’s result is
valid only when the forecasts are computed with unrestrictedly increasing degree of accuracy.
When some level of discreteness is fixed, we present a game-theoretic generalization of Oakes’
example for randomized forecasting that is a test failing any given method of deferministic
forecasting; originally, this example was presented for deterministic calibration.
Key words: Universal prediction, Randomized prediction, Randomized rounding, Calibration,
Game-theoretic approach to probability, Oakes’ example
1. Introduction
Using the game-theoretic framework for probability [9], Vovk and Shafer have shown
in [10] that it is always possible, using randomization, to make sequential probability fore-
casts that pass any countable set of well-behaved statistical tests. This result generalizes
work by other authors, among them are Foster and Vohra [4], Kakade and Foster [5],
Lehrer [6], Sandrony et al. [8], who consider only tests of calibration.
We complement this result with a lower bound. We show that Vovk and Shafer’s result
is valid only when the forecasts are computed with unrestrictedly increasing degree of
accuracy. When some level of discreteness is fixed, we present a game-theoretic version
1 This research was partially supported by Russian foundation for fundamental research: 06-01-00122-a.
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of Oakes’ example for randomized forecasting that is a test failing any given method of
deterministic forecasting; originally, this example was presented for deterministic cali-
bration. To formulate this example, we use the forecasting game presented by Vovk and
Shafer [10], namely Binary Forecasting Game II.
We discuss details of the randomized forecasting algorithms in Section 2.
The Shafer and Vovk’s [9] game-theoretic framework is considered in Section 3. We
present in this section the original Vovk and Shafer’s [10] result on universal randomized
forecasting and prove our result which gives the limits for such forecasting - a game-
theoretic version of the Oakes’ example for randomized forecasting.
2. Background
The research discussed in this paper was started from a notion of calibration, originated
by Dawid [1,2]. A test of calibration checks whether the observed empirical frequencies
of state occurrences converge to their forecaster probabilities.
Let I(p) denote the indicator function of a subinterval I ⊆ [0, 1], i.e., I(p) = 1 if p ∈ I,
and I(p) = 0, otherwise. An infinite sequence of forecasts p1, p2, . . . is well-calibrated for
an infinite sequence of outcomes ω1ω2 . . . if for the characteristic function I(p) of any
subinterval of [0, 1] the calibration error tends to zero, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 I(pi)(ωi − pi)∑n
i=1 I(pi)
→ 0 (1)
as the denominator of the relation (1) tends to infinity. Here, I(pi) determines some
“selection rule” which defines indices i where we compute the deviation between forecasts
pi and outcomes ωi.
The main problem of sequential forecasting is to define a universal forecasting algo-
rithm which computes forecasts pn given past observations ω1, . . . , ωn−1 for each n. This
universal prediction algorithm should be well-calibrated for each infinite sequence of out-
comes. Oakes [7] proposed arguments (see Dawid [3] for a different proof) that no such
algorithm can be well-calibrated for all possible sequences: any forecasting algorithm
cannot be calibrated for the sequence ω = ω1ω2 . . ., where
ωi =


1 if pi < 0.5
0 otherwise
and pi are forecasts computed by the algorithm given ω1, . . . , ωi−1, i = 1, 2, . . .. The
corresponding intervals are I0 = [0, 0.5) and I1 = [0.5, 1]. It is easy to see that the
condition (1) of calibration fails for this ω, where I = I0 or I = I1.
Foster and Vohra [4] show that calibration is almost surely guaranteed with a random-
izing forecasting rule, i.e., where the forecasts are chosen using internal randomization.
Kakade and Foster [5] noticed that some calibration results require very little randomiza-
tion. They defined “an almost deterministic” randomized rounding universal forecasting
algorithm f : for any sequence of outcomes ω1ω2 . . ., an observer can only randomly round
the deterministic forecast up to ∆ in order to calibrate with the internal probability 1
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∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(pi)(ωi − pi)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∆, (2)
where ∆ is the calibration error, I(p) is the indicator function of an arbitrary subinterval
of [0, 1].
This approach was further developed by, among others, Lehrer [6], Sandrony et al. [8].
These papers were only concerned with asymptotic calibration. Non-asymptotic version
of randomized forecasting was proposed by Vovk and Shafer [10] and by Vovk et al. [11].
They based on the game-theoretic framework of Shafer and Vovk [9].
Let P{0, 1} be the set of all measures on the two-element set {0, 1}. Any measure from
P{0, 1} is represented by a number p ∈ [0, 1] - the probability of {1}. We consider also
the set of all measures on P{0, 1}. Let P [0, 1] be the set of all probability measures on
the unit interval [0, 1] supplied with the standard Borel σ-field F .
Randomizing forecasting is defined as follows. For each n, a forecaster given a binary
sequence of past outcomes ω1 . . . ωn−1 (and a sequence of past forecasts p1, . . . , pn−1)
outputs a probability distribution Pn ∈ P [0, 1]. The forecasts pn of the the future event
ωn = 1 are distributed according to this probability distribution.
Assume for each n, the probability distribution Pn is concentrated on a finite subset
Dn of [0, 1], say, Dn = {pn,1, . . . , pn,mn}. The number ∆ = lim inf
n→∞
∆n, where
∆n = inf{|pn,i − pn,j| : i 6= j},
is called the level of discreteness of the corresponding forecasting scheme on the sequence
ω1ω2 . . ..
In general case Dn is a predictable random variable, i.e., measurable with respect to
the σ-field Fn−1, depending on ω1 . . . ωn−1.
A typical example is the uniform rounding: for each n, rational points pn,i divide the
unit interval into equal parts of size 0 < ∆ < 1 and Pn is concentrated on these points.
In this case the level of discreteness on arbitrary sequence ω1ω2 . . . equals ∆.
3. Game-theoretic randomized forecasting
Shafer and Vovk [9] proposed a game-theoretic framework for probability theory. In
Vovk and Shafer [10] they used this framework to demonstrate the possibility of good
probability forecasting in a general setting. This result generalizes the previous work of
many authors.
Vovk and Shafer presented a game between Reality, Forecaster and Skeptic. In this
game, Forecaster faces Skeptic whose strategy is revealed in advance, and he is allowed
to use a degree of randomization to conceal each of his probability forecasts until the
corresponding outcome has been announced. Their main result says that Forecaster can
keep Skeptic from becoming infinitely reach. Intuitively, this means that the outcomes
determined by Reality look random with respect to probability forecasts. This result is
a consequence of the von Neumann’s minimax theorem.
Vovk and Shafer [10] consider a perfect-information game of randomized forecasting -
Binary Forecasting Game II between three players - Forecaster, Skeptic, Reality, Random
Number Generator described by the following protocol:
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Let K0 = 1 and F0 = 1.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .
Skeptic announces Sn : [0, 1]→R.
Forecaster announces a probability distribution Pn ∈ P [0, 1].
Reality announces ωn ∈ {0, 1}.
Forecaster announces fn : [0, 1]→R such that
∫
fn(p)Pn(dp) ≤ 0.
Random Number Generator announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Skeptic updates his capital Kn = Kn−1 + Sn(pn)(ωn − pn).
Forecaster updates his capital Fn = Fn−1 + fn(pn).
ENDFOR
Restriction on Skeptic: Skeptic must choose the Sn so that his capital Kn is nonnegative
for all n no matter how the other players move.
Restriction on Forecaster: Forecaster must choose the Pn and fn so that his capital
Fn is nonnegative for all n no matter how the other players move.
Vovk and Shafer [10] showed that Forecaster has a winning strategy in the Forecasting
Game II, where Forecaster wins if either (i) his capital Fn is unbounded or (ii) Skeptic’s
capital Kn stays bounded; otherwise the other players win.
Theorem 1 Forecaster has a winning strategy in Binary Forecasting Game II.
Sketch of the proof. For completeness of the presentation, we reproduce the proof from [10].
The proof is based on von Neumann’s minimax theorem.
At first, at any round n of Binary Forecasting Game II, a simple auxiliary game between
Realty and Forecaster is considered: Forecaster chooses pn ∈ [0, 1], Realty chooses ωn ∈
{0, 1}. Forecaster losses (and Realty gains) S(pn)(ωn − pn).
For any mixed strategy of Realty Qn ∈ P{0, 1}, let Forecaster’s strategy be pn = Q{1}.
So, the Realty’s expected gain is S(pn)(1−Q{1})Q{1}+S(pn)(0−Q{1})(1−Q{1}) = 0.
In order to apply von Neumann’s minimax theorem, which requires that move space be
finite, we replace Forecaster move space [0, 1] with a finite subset of [0, 1] dense enough
that the value of the game is smaller than some arbitrary small positive number ∆
(depending on n). This is possible, since |Sn(p)| ≤ Kn−1 ≤ 2n−1. 2 The minimax theorem
asserts that Forecaster has a mixed strategy P ∈ P [0, 1] such that
∫
Sn(p)(ωn − p)P (dp) ≤ ∆ (3)
for both ωn = 0 and ωn = 1.
Let E∆ be the subset of P [0, 1] consisting all probability measures P satisfying (3) for
ωn = 0 and ωn = 1. Endowed with the weak topology, P [0, 1] is compact. Since each
E∆ is closed, ∩E∆i 6= ∅, where ∆i, i = 1, 2, . . ., is some decreasing to 0 sequence of real
numbers. So there exists Pn ∈ P [0, 1] such that
∫
Sn(p)(ωn − p)Pn(dp) ≤ 0
for both ωn = 0 and ωn = 1.
In Binary Forecasting Game II, consider the strategy for Forecaster that uses at any
round n the probability distribution Pn just defined and uses as his second move the
2 Skeptic must choose Sn(p) such that Kn ≥ 0 for all n no matter the other players move.
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function fn defined fn(p) = Sn(p)(ωn − p). Then Fn = Kn for all n. So either Skeptic’s
capital will stay bounded or Forecaster’s capital will be unbounded. △
Vovk et al. [11] (see also [10]) also showed that Skeptic can present a strategy Sn(p)
such that the winning strategy of Forecaster existing by Theorem 1 announces forecasts
p1, p2, . . . which are well-calibrated for an arbitrary sequence ω1ω2 . . . of outcomes.
In that follows we consider some version of the Oakes’ example in the game-theoretic
framework. A different version of this result is given in [12].
We consider some modification of Binary Forecasting Game II in which Skeptic (but
not Forecaster) announces fn : [0, 1] → R. This means that Skeptic defines the test of
randomness he needs.
Also, at each step n, Skeptic divide his capital into two accounts: Kn = Qn + Fn; he
uses the capital Fn to force Random Number Generator to generate random numbers
which pass the test fn.
Let K0 = 2.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . .
Skeptic announces Sn : [0, 1]→R.
Forecaster announces a probability distribution Pn ∈ P [0, 1].
Reality announces ωn ∈ {0, 1}.
Skeptic announces fn : [0, 1]→ R such that
∫
fn(p)Pn(dp) ≤ 0.
Random Number Generator announces pn ∈ [0, 1].
Skeptic updates his capital Kn = Kn−1 + Sn(pn)(ωn − pn) + fn(pn).
ENDFOR
We divide the Skeptic’s capital into two parts:
Kn = Qn + Fn for all n, where
Q0 = 1 and F0 = 1.
Qn = Qn−1 + Sn(pn)(ωn − pn) and
Fn = Fn−1 + fn(pn).
Restriction on Skeptic: Skeptic must choose the Sn and fn so that his capital Kn is
nonnegative for all n no matter how the other players move.
Actually, Skeptic will choose the Sn and fn so that both of his capitals Qn and Fn are
nonnegative for all n no matter how the other players move.
We prove that when Forecaster uses finite subsets of [0, 1] for randomization Realty
and Skeptic can defeat Forecaster (and Random Number Generator) in this forecasting
game, where Realty and Skeptic win if Skeptic’s capital Kn is unbounded; otherwise
Forecaster and Random Number Generator win.
Theorem 2 Assume Forecaster’s uses a randomized strategy with a positive level of
discreteness on each infinite sequence ω. Then Realty and Skeptic win in the modified
Binary Forecasting Game II.
Proof. Define a strategy for Realty: at any step n Realty announces an outcome
ωn =


0 if Pn((0.5, 1]) > 0.5
1 otherwise.
We follow Shafer and Vovk’s [9] method of defining the defensive strategy for Skeptic.
Let ǫk = 2
−k, k = 1, 2, . . .. We define recursively by n: Qs,k0 = 1, S
s,k
0 (p) = 0, s = 1, 2,
and for n ≥ 1
5
S1,kn (p) = −ǫkQ
1,k
n−1ξ(p > 0.5), (4)
S2,kn (p) = ǫkQ
2,k
n−1ξ(p ≤ 0.5), (5)
where ξ(true) = 1, ξ(false) = 0, and for n ≥ 1
Q1,kn = Q
1,k
n−1 + S
1,k
n (pn)(ωn − pn)), (6)
Q2,kn = Q
2,k
n−1 + S
2,k
n (pn)(ωn − pn)). (7)
We combine S1,kn (p) and S
2,k
n (p) in the Skeptic’s strategy Sn(p) =
1
2
(S1n(p) + S
2
n(p)),
where
S1n(p) =
∞∑
k=1
ǫkS
1,k
n (p)
and
S2n(p) =
∞∑
k=1
ǫkS
2,k
n (p).
It can be proved by the mathematical induction on n that 0 ≤ Qi,kn ≤ 2
n and |Si,kn (p)| ≤
2n−1 for i = 1, 2 and for all k, p and n. Then these sums are finite for each n and p.
By (6)-(7) the Skeptic’s capital Qn at step n, when he follows the strategy Sn(p),
equals
Qn =
1
2
∞∑
k=1
ǫk(Q
1,k
n +Q
2,k
n ).
Define for each n the function gn(p) = (2ξ(p ≤ 0.5) − 1)(ωn − p). Let EPn(gn) =∫
gn(p)Pn(dp).
Recall that Forecaster uses some randomized strategy Pn, n = 1, 2, . . ..
We define recursively by n: Fk0 = 1, g
k
0 (p) = 0, and for n ≥ 1
gkn(p) = −ǫkF
k
n−1(gn(p)− EPn(gn)), (8)
where ǫk = 2
−k, and for n ≥ 1
Fkn = F
k
n−1 + g
k
n(pn) (9)
By definition for any k and n,
Fkn =
n∏
j=1
(1 − ǫk(gj(pj)− EPj (gj))). (10)
By (10) 0 ≤ Fkn ≤ 2
n for all n and k.
Finally, Skeptic defines at step n
fn(p) =
∞∑
k=1
ǫkg
k
n(p).
By definition
∫
fn(p)Pn(dp) ≤ 0.
By (10) the Skeptic’s capital Fn at step n, when he follows the strategy fn(p), equals
Fn =
∞∑
k=1
ǫkF
k
n .
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Also, Fn ≥ 0 for all n.
Suppose that sup
n
Fn = C <∞, where C > 0. Then sup
n
Fkn <
C
ǫk
for each k.
We have for each k,
lnFkn ≥ −ǫk
n∑
j=1
(gj(pj)− EPj (gj))− nǫ
2
k.
Here we use the inequality ln(1 + r) ≥ r − r2 for all |r| ≤ 1
2
.
Since Fn is bounded by C > 0, we have for any k
1
n
n∑
j=1
(gj(pj)− EPj (gj)) ≥
− lnC + ln(ǫk)
nǫk
− ǫk ≥ −2ǫk (11)
for all sufficiently large n.
Define two variables
ϑn,1 =
n∑
j=1
ξ(pj > 0.5)(ωj − pj),
ϑn,2 =
n∑
j=1
ξ(pj ≤ 0.5)(ωj − pj).
By definition of gj,
ϑn,2 − ϑn,1 =
n∑
j=1
gj(pj).
For technical reason define g1,j(p) = ξ(p > 0.5)(ωj − p) and g2,j(p) = ξ(p ≤ 0.5)(ωj − p).
Then gj(p) = g2,j(p)− g1,j(p).
Assume for any n the probability distribution Pn is concentrated on a finite set
{pn,1, . . . , pn,mn}.
For technical reason, if necessary, we add 0 and 1 to the support set of Pn and set their
probabilities to be 0. Denote p−n = max{pn,t : pn,t ≤ 0.5} and p
+
n = min{pn,t : pn,t >
0.5}.
By definition ωn, p
+
n and p
−
n are predictable and p
+
n − p
−
n ≥ ∆ for all n, where ∆ > 0.
We have
n∑
j=1
EPj (g1,j) ≤
∑
ωj=0
Pj{p > 0.5}(−p
+
j ) +
∑
ωj=1
Pj{p > 0.5}(1− p
+
j ) ≤
−0.5
n∑
j=1
ξ(ωj = 0)p
+
j + 0.5
n∑
j=1
ξ(ωj = 1)(1− p
+
j ). (12)
n∑
j=1
EPj (g2,j) ≥
∑
ωj=0
Pj{p ≤ 0.5}(−p
−
j ) +
∑
ωj=1
Pj{p ≤ 0.5}(1− p
−
j ) ≥
−0.5
n∑
j=1
ξ(ωj = 0)p
−
j + 0.5
n∑
j=1
ξ(ωj = 1)(1− p
−
j ). (13)
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Subtracting (12) from (13), we obtain
n∑
j=1
EPj (gj) =
n∑
j=1
EPj (g2,j)−
n∑
j=1
EPj (g1,j) ≥ 0.5∆n.
Using (11), we obtain for all sufficiently large n
1
n
(ϑn,2 − ϑn,1) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
gj(pj) ≥
1
n
n∑
j=1
EPj (gj)− 2ǫk ≥ 0.5∆− 2ǫk. (14)
Now we compute a lower bound of Skeptic’s capital.
We have from the definition (4)-(5) and (15)-(16).
Q1,kn =
n∏
j=1
(1− ǫkξ(pj > 0.5)(ωj − pj)), (15)
Q2.kn =
n∏
j=1
(1 + ǫkξ(pj ≤ 0.5)(ωj − pj)). (16)
By (15) and (16), for i = 1, 2, 0 ≤ Qi,kn ≤ 2
n for all n no matter how the other players
move.
By (15)-(16) at step n
lnQ1,kn ≥ −ǫkϑn,1 − ǫ
2
kn, (17)
lnQ2,kn ≥ ǫkϑn,2 − ǫ
2
kn. (18)
The inequalities (17), (18) and (14) imply
lim sup
n→∞
lnQ1n + lnQ
2
n
n
≥ 0.5ǫk∆− 2ǫ
2
k ≥ 2ǫ
2
k (19)
for all sufficiently large n, where ǫk ≤
1
8
∆.
From this, we obtain that for i = 1 or for i = 2,
lim sup
n→∞
lnQi,kn
n
≥ ǫ2k
for all sufficiently large n.
Hence, we obtain for the total capital of Skeptic Kn = Qn + Fn
lim sup
n→∞
Kn =∞
no matter how Forecaster moves if Realty uses her strategy defined above.
We obtain also a lower bound of calibration error for Binary Forecasting Game II.
Corollary 1 Assume Forecaster’s uses a randomized strategy with a positive level of
discreteness on each infinite sequence ω. Then Realty can announce an infinite binary
sequence ω1ω2 . . . such that
lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣∣ 1nϑn,i
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0.25∆ (20)
8
for i = 1 or for i = 2.
This inequality immediately follows from (14).
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